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    Abstract  
 
Much has been said about the role that technological networking 
activities play on the innovative performance of firms, but little is 
known about the relevance of the context where the firm is locate 
shaping the efficiency of such networking activities. In this article 
we hypothesize that the transformation of firms' networking 
activities into innovation may vary depending on the regional 
environment in which the firm is located. For Spanish 
manufactures in the period 2000-12 and through the use of a 
multilevel framework, we obtain that after controlling for the firm's 
characteristics, the regional context has not only a direct effect on 
firms' innovation performance, but it also conditions the returns to 
firms' networking activities, although differently in the case of 
cooperation and outsourcing. Cooperating in innovation activities 
is more beneficial for those firms located in a knowledge intensive 
region, whereas R&D outsourcing seems to be more profitable for 
firms in regions with a low knowledge pool. 
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1 Introduction
Literature on innovation economics has extensively analyzed how the combination and recom-
bination of previously unconnected ideas lead to new knowledge production and subsequent
technological innovations (Aghion et al., 1998). Knowledge diusion in the form of knowledge
spillovers is crucial in this literature as a cause of the geographic agglomeration of rms (Au-
dretsch and Feldman, 1996; Jae et al., 1993). At the end of the nineteenth century, Marshall
(1890) already described how rms could benet from spatial concentration: taking advan-
tage of input-output relationships within industries, thanks to labor market pooling, as well as
beneting from positive knowledge externalities arising from other rms. Almost one century
later, endogenous growth models (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1990; Grossman and Helpman,
1991) restored the emphasis on knowledge spillovers with the consideration that rms create
new knowledge proting from the body of knowledge of the whole society.
As a consequence of the existence of shared agglomeration externalities, and more speci-
cally for our case, the existence of knowledge spillovers, most geography of innovation scholars
have conrmed the role of physical proximity in fostering knowledge diusion. It is widely be-
lieved that rms sharing the same environmental conditions are more similar in their innovation
performance than rms that do not share the same environment, emphasizing the impact of the
context in which the rm is located on the innovation ability of the rm (Cooke and Morgan,
1998; Storper, 1997). However, we believe that the mechanism by which the regional context
shapes the innovative performance of rms is still poorly understood. This paper tries to give
a step forward in this direction with the main objective of providing evidence on the hypoth-
esis that the regional context not only exerts a direct eect on rms' innovation performance
but also mediates with rms' internal characteristics/activities. Specically, we hypothesize
that the returns that the rms obtain from their networking activities may vary across regions
depending on regional determinants.
Indeed, the networking activities carried by the rms have been considered in previous
literature to be one of the main determinants of rms' innovation performance (Laursen and
Salter, 2006; Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011). This is so as networking is a relevant tool to acquire
knowledge external to the rm (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001), both at the local level but also
through building pipelines to benet from knowledge hotspots around the world (Bathelt et al.,
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2004). Among other strategies, we can think of technological collaboration agreements or
R&D outsourcing, which act as channels through which knowledge is transferred throughout
the space allowing for new recombination of ideas (Fratesi and Senn, 2009). Although the
positive impact of such strategies on rms' innovation performance is well documented in the
literature, an important novel insight in this paper is that these benets may not be the same
across dierent regional contexts. Explicitly, we hypothesize that the transformation of rms'
networking activities into innovation may vary depending on the regional environment in which
the rm is located.
All in all, this paper aligns to the literature trying to analyze the role of the regional deter-
minants of innovation using rm-level data. From a methodological perspective, we take into
account the fact that characteristics at the regional level are not automatically reproduced at
the rm level because information on the variance between rms is lost when data at an aggre-
gated regional level are used (van Oort et al., 2012)  what is known as the ecological fallacy.
Using multilevel modeling allows the micro and macro levels to be modeled simultaneously
(Hox, 2002) and can be understood as a natural way to assess the relevance of the regional
context. We use a panel of manufacturing enterprises in Spain starting from 2000 until 2012
and take into account some characteristics related to the knowledge generation capacity of the
region where the rm is located.
Among the main results, we obtain that the regional context seems to exert a positive direct
inuence on rms' innovative performance but not as much as rm characteristics themselves.
Among such internal characteristics, technological cooperation and R&D outsourcing present
a signicant inuence. However, the regional context implies a more subtle and indirect eect
shaping the return that rms obtain from such networking activities. As such, rms located
in knowledge-intensive regions obtain higher returns of cooperation agreements in terms of
innovative performance. On the contrary, rms in regions with low knowledge levels tend to
present higher returns to R&D outsourcing.
The article is outlined as follows. Next, we oer the literature review upon which this
article is based, followed by the dataset section with the description of the variables, while the
methodology is subsequently presented. Then, we oer the main results and conclude with
some limitations of the paper and policy implications.
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2 Literature review
2.1 Firm's networking activities
A rm that wants to survive and grow needs to be innovative and adapt to more dynamic
and global markets. Having the knowledge to do this is of the upmost importance, and it
can be found within the rm but also beyond its boundaries. Indeed, the current tendency
to acquire external knowledge through mechanisms such as cooperation agreements or through
outsourcing (OECD, 2008) is gaining weight as an strategy to become more innovative.
Many papers provide empirical evidence that external knowledge-sourcing strategies have a
positive and signicant impact on innovation performance (Laursen and Salter, 2006; Nieto and
Rodríguez, 2011; Mihalache et al., 2012), whereas as noted by Dachs et al. (2012, 10) studies
that nd a negative impact are very scarce. In this sense, the open innovation literature
(Chesbrough, 2003) has stressed the necessity for rms to access such knowledge external to
the rm in order not to be locked in the internal structure/way of thinking of the enterprise.
On the one hand, collaborative research with a broad range of partners may enable inno-
vating rms to acquire the required information from a variety of sources which could lead
to more synergies and intake of complementary knowledge, thus promoting innovation perfor-
mance (Belderbos et al., 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006). In this sense, collaboration with other
organizations is due to the necessity of solving new kinds of problems for which the market
does not have a proper solution, leading to the need for more interactions among organizations.
This kind of strategy requires face-to-face contacts reducing the likelihood of appropriation
of some specic ideas/projects due to the fact that both enterprises have knowledge of each
other's projects while building a relationship of trust. At the same time, collaboration may give
access to a more intangible and tacit knowledge and know-how not easy to spill over (Teirlinck
and Spithoven, 2013). Indeed, previous literature has recognized that cooperation embeds a
complex/technical knowledge structure which ts with the idea previously stressed related to
the appearance of new types of problems-solving requirements (Teirlinck and Spithoven, 2013;
Dhont-Peltrault and Pster, 2011).
On the other hand, outsourcing part of the innovation process allows an enterprise to gain
access to a new source of well-prepared labor (Lewin et al., 2009), to capture external knowledge
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cheaply, as well as to widen the scope of internationalization of the rm, gaining access to new
markets and new knowledge, increasing the eciency of its internal capabilities (Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2006; OECD, 2008, 20, 91). At the same time, outsourcing may allow the enterprise
to gain in productivity and eciency through an improved restructuring of its internal resources,
like managerial attention and a focus on core competences in what the rm does best while
taking advantage of what the contracted rm is specialized in. However, R&D outsourcing
may have a higher risk of appropriation of internal knowledge (Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011)
by the contracted rm, so that this could be a reason why rms tend to outsource non-core
activities, which imply a less technical and more standardized and codied knowledge (Teirlinck
and Spithoven, 2013).
On the basis of the arguments above and the empirical evidence obtained in previous liter-
ature, we posit our rst hypothesis:
H1: Firms that cooperate in innovation activities and rms that do R&D outsourcing are
expected to present a better innovative performance.
2.2 The rm's environment: Why does the region matter?
The regional development literature (Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998) stresses that
the environment where the rm is located can be essential to recombine and exploit previous
existing pieces of knowledge. Regions concentrating research and development expenditures,
highly skilled workers, institutions enabling innovation, the presence of research centers and
universities, among others, are in a better position to generate new knowledge and innovation.
In addition, a main advantage of a rm located in such an environment is due to the fact
that the knowledge produced by a rm is only partially appropriated by the producer, whereas
part of such knowledge spills over to other rms and institutions (Feldman and Audretsch,
1999; Jae et al., 1993). Thanks to the presence of such knowledge spillovers, rms can get
external economies of scale if they co-locate close to other rms, pointing to the relevance of the
regional context for rms' innovative performance. The notions of industrial districts (Scott
and Storper, 2003), innovation milieu (Keeble and Wilkinson, 1999) and clusters (Porter, 1990)
are some of the labels used to refer to such context.
In addition, the regional innovation system (RIS) literature (Cooke et al., 1997) considers
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that subnational units have the economic power and the capacity to use central funds in an
autonomous way, or to nance and design their own innovation policies, so that dierences
in technological performance cannot be explained by rms in isolation but at the regional
level (Uyarra, 2009). Besides, competitiveness and innovation are determined at regional levels
basically because innovation is not homogenously distributed across space. Despite the spread
of information and communication technologies (ICT), innovation is remarkably concentrated
in the space probably as a consequence of the relevance of geographical proximity for the
generation of new ideas and knowledge (Boschma, 2005; European Commission, 2014). Thus,
face-to-face contacts, the application of the same interpretative schemes of new knowledges,
a similar experience with a particular set of problem-solving techniques, and shared cultural
traditions, make interaction less costly in a shorter distance such as the one within a region
(Malmberg and Maskell, 2006, 9).
As a consequence of the existence of regional knowledge spillovers and the relevance of the
RIS, there is broad agreement that rms benet from being located in regions with a rich
knowledge base (Audretsch and Dohse, 2007). Previous evidence suggests that R&D spillovers
are more abundant in regions with a high concentration of knowledge activities (Love and
Roper, 2001). Therefore, the presence of a higher knowledge endowment/base in a region is
expected to impact positively the innovation performance of its rms. That is, the regional
context is assumed to have a positive direct impact of the innovative performance of the rms
located in it.
As a consequence of the arguments above, we posit the next hypothesis:
H2: Firms located in regions with a large knowledge base will obtain a higher innovation
output.
2.3 The interplay of networking activities and the regional context
As stated in López-Bazo and Motellón (2018), a drawback in most of the previous studies
analyzing the impact of the regional context on the rms' innovative performance is the lack
of consideration of the interactions between rm characteristics and regional variables. In our
case, we believe that the regional innovative endowment not only presents a direct impact on
the rms' innovative performance but can also have an indirect one by shaping the eect of
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rms' networking activities. Closely related to our objective, Love and Roper (2001) reported
that the region aects the eciency with which R&D, technology transfer and networking
are translated into innovation outputs in Germany, Ireland and the UK. Indeed, knowledge
acquisition through networking, such as technological cooperation and R&D outsourcing, can
be assumed to link to the regional context, so that both become reciprocally supporting.
On the one hand, the more advanced the networking mechanisms that bring information
about new technologies into a local environment, the more dynamic the milieu from which local
actors prot. On the other hand, a more technologically advanced regional context presents
stronger knowledge spillovers that may allow for better selection of external knowledge/partners
(European Commission, 2014) as well as better translation and integration processes of such
knowledge into the rm. Firms that work in more knowledge intensive environments will there-
fore have advantages in accessing new knowledge through networking activities in comparison
to rms located in less innovative regions. This way, the regional context and rms' networking
activities could complement each other (Malmberg and Maskell, 2006). This complementarity
would imply a self-reinforcing mechanism between knowledge intensive rms and regions.
However, there are contrasting arguments pointing to negative eects coming from regions
that present a lot of knowledge externalities. For instance, rms located in regions with a high
knowledge pool may face a erce degree of competition, which would lead to the necessity of
rms incorporating a higher degree of novelty embedded in new technologies acquired through
networking activities. Also, for enterprises with leading in-house knowledge, they would not
benet so much from the spillover of poorer knowledge, whereas they would lose if their richer
knowledge spills over to competitors (Phene and Tallman, 2014). Another negative eect from
locating in high knowledge regions in situations of intense rivalry is labor poaching, that is, the
loss of qualied human capital to competitors, which in some cases can outweigh the benets of
labor market pooling (Grillitsch and Nilsson, 2017). As a consequence, in regions with a higher
level of knowledge externalities, and possibly with a higher level of competition, the negative
eects of knowledge spillovers could overcome the positive ones.
Derived from the contradicting arguments above, it is not straightforward whether network-
ing activities (technological cooperation and R&D outsourcing, among the main ones) should
benet equally from the regional context. Given that the knowledge acquired through techno-
logical cooperation agreements tend to present dierent characteristics than the one acquired
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through R&D outsourcing, we argue that the role of the regional environment could be dier-
ent in both strategies. The important point here is the explicit dierentiation between tacit
and codied/explicit knowledge (Polanyi, 1966). Codied knowledge may travel frictionless
across the space and across agents through, among other things, ICT and can be purchased in
markets for technology with little interaction with other agents (e.g., R&D outsourcing). On
the contrary, tacit knowledge, highly contextual, and hard to articulate in articles, patents, or
books, is dicult to transfer and is better transmitted in the form of face-to-face interactions.
This implies the necessity of interactive learning (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999) that would give
place to cooperation agreements.
As a consequence of this dierentiation, the endowment of knowledge available in the region
where the rm is located conditions the returns of these two strategies, albeit in dierent ways.
Indeed, in the case of rms carrying out technological cooperation agreements as a way to
introduce external knowledge with a more tacit component, the gains from local knowledge
spillovers can be stronger given that they will allow the rm to further elaborate the external
knowledge acquired through cooperation. Thus, there would exist a reinforcement link between
a rm pursuing cooperation in innovation activities and being located in a region with a high
knowledge pool. This leads to our third hypothesis:
H3: Firms located in regions with high knowledge endowment will obtain higher returns to
technological cooperation in terms of innovative output.
In contrast, when outsourcing codied knowledge, rms located in low-knowledge regions
may prosper because they are less dependent on local knowledge spillovers (the knowledge ac-
quired through outsourcing is standard and easy to codify) and are less likely to experience
negative knowledge spillovers coming from closely located competitors given the low amount of
innovation taking place in them. This way, the benets associated with knowledge agglomera-
tions may not be so necessary for rms that outsource part of their knowledge, at least the most
codied knowledge. That is, rms that outsource part of their R&D activity are in a better
position to get the knowledge produced elsewhere and to lessen the weaknesses of the region
where they are located while not incurring in erce competition. Thus, our fourth hypothesis
stands as follows:
H4: Firms located in regions with low knowledge endowment will obtain higher returns to
R&D outsourcing in terms of innovative output.
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Since the research in a region can be made either by private or public institutions and given
the dierent characteristics they present (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), one may think that the
role of the regional context can be dierent depending on the prevalence of one over the other
at the regional level.
First, the research developed by the private sector presents a more applied component and
is focused mainly on market protability, cost eectiveness, reliability of new solutions and
time to market, whereas the type of research developed by public research centers has a more
science-based component and is not focused on market protability, being far away from the
necessities of private rms in several respects. Second, previous literature stresses the relevance
of short term innovations in the case of private organizations in contrast to public research
institutions that spend a much longer time frame for developing an innovation  around seven
years as stressed by Feldman and Florida (1994). Finally, another important dierence lies on
the moment of the life-cycle of R&D, public institutions being more focused in the early stages
and private organizations in the latter stages.
As argued in the hypotheses above, a rm that cooperates in innovation activities gets
higher benets from regional knowledge spillovers given that they will allow the rm to further
elaborate the external knowledge acquired through cooperation which tends to be of a more
tacit component. If the regional knowledge base is mainly the result of research developed
by the private sector (i.e. with an applied component, market-oriented and focused in the
latter stages of the life-cycle of R&D), the knowledge spillovers arising from such a region can
make cooperation more eective in terms of generating higher returns to the rm's innovative
performance. On the contrary, if the regional knowledge base is mainly the result of research
developed by the public sector (i.e. being science-oriented and not market-oriented, devoting
much longer time frame for developing an innovation, and focused in the early stages of the
R&D), the knowledge spillovers arising from such a region will not be protable for the rms'
purpose and will make cooperation less eective since the rm may incur in a higher cost for
implementing such a knowledge. As a consequence of the arguments above, our fth hypotheses
stand as follows:
H5a: The returns to cooperation activities will be higher if the rm is located in regions
with higher research expenditures developed by private agents.
H5b: The returns to cooperation activities will be lower if the rm is located in regions
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with higher research expenditures developed by public agents.
For a rm that outsources part of its R&D, we have given arguments above that the kind
of knowledge that can be purchased is of a codied/stardard nature, so that rms are less
dependent on local knowledge spillovers (because the knowledge acquired through outsourcing
is easy to codify). Thus, being in a region with a low knowledge base does not present a main
disadvantage while beneting from the fact of being less likely to experience erce competition
due to the low innovation activity in them. The same happens if the rm is located in a region
where the knowledge base is mainly the result of research developed by the public sector, which
does not imply competition in innovation terms and which, despite being not market-oriented,
does not involve any disadvantage for the rm making outsourcing since the knowledge spillovers
coming from regional context are less important in them. Quite the reverse would happen if
the outsourcing rm is located in a region where the knowledge base is mainly the result of
research developed by the private sector. In such a case, the competition for getting innovations
is erce (given that a lot of private innovation activity with a market-oriented prole is taking
place) whereas the benets from the knowledge spillovers stemming from the private sector are
minimal in the case of the outsourcing strategy. Then, our last hypotheses arise:
H6a: The returns to R&D outsourcing activities will be higher if the rm is located in
regions with higher research expenditures developed by public agents.
H6b: The returns to R&D outsourcing activities will be lower if the rm is located in
regions with higher research expenditures developed by private agents.
3 Dataset and variables
3.1 Dataset
The dataset we use at the rm level is the Spanish Survey on Business Strategies  ESEE from
now on  that consists on an unbalanced panel of manufacturing enterprises starting from 1990
until 2014 with around 1,800 rms surveyed yearly by the SEPI Foundation with an agreement
with the Ministry of Industry. Firms are classied into twenty industries using the two-digit
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European classication NACE (see Table A1 in the online Appendix).1 The ESEE's population
of reference is composed of rms with 10 or more employees within the manufacturing industry.
Moreover, the geographical scope of reference is the Spanish economy as a whole even though
information of the location of the main plant is targeted in the survey. The initial selection
was carried out combining exhaustiveness for rms with more than 200 employees and random
sampling for rms employing 10 to 200 workers. These rms were selected through a stratied,
proportional and systematic sampling with a random seed.
As for the regional dataset, we use Eurostat at the NUTS 2 level. In the Spanish case these
territorial units represent administrative and policy authorities, and even though all of them
belong to the same national context, they present an important heterogeneity. First, Spain is
one of the four European countries presenting the widest regional heterogeneity in innovation
(European Commission, 2014). Second, Spanish regions have legal competencies and nancial
autonomy in terms of innovation policies and present important socio-cultural dierences that
could lead to dierent learning process as stressed by Cooke et al. (1997). Third, the territorial
coverage as well as the implementation of the operational programs of the European Structural
funds  an instrument of the European Union cohesion policy that aim to reduce the regional
disparities in R&D and innovation  in Spain is at NUTS 2 regional level (European Com-
mission, 2014). Finally, regarding the socio-cultural aspect which is an important source of
the learning process according to the RIS literature, Spain has four dierent languages apart
from Spanish, which are ocially talked in six regions  Catalonia, Valencia, Basque Country,
Galicia, Balearic Island, and Navarre  highlighting a social and cultural diversity higher than
in other European countries. All these reasons endorse the regional heterogeneity expected in
our empirical exercise. The period under consideration ranges between 2000 and 2012, since
some of the variables taken from Eurostat are not provided for more recent years.
Given that the ESEE is a survey in which values are self-reported, one could think of the
problem of measurement errors and/or self-reported values. However, in this kind of survey,
where anonymity is a legal concern, we do not expect a systematic propensity for over or
under-reporting the innovation carried out by the enterprise (Aarstad et al., 2016).
1More details on the sample, the quality and validation of the information can be obtained from: https:
//www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/esee/en/spresentacion.asp
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3.2 Firm level variables
Our dependent variable is the number of product innovations (NIP), as a proxy for the inno-
vative output, which has been used in previous studies at the rm level (Blundell et al., 1995;
Chatterji and Fabrizio, 2014; Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Segarra-
Ciprés et al., 2012). In our opinion, this measure is more accurate than just the decision to
engage on product innovations (as in Naz et al., 2015; Srholec, 2010) since it takes into account
the number of innovations made. Following the explanation given by Katila and Ahuja (2002),
a rm developing a higher number of product innovations may see an improve in its markets
share, its market value, as well as in its survivability. Moreover, we have reasons to focus on
product instead of process innovations. Building on previous evidence, networking activities
aiming at the acquisition of knowledge external to the rm has a higher impact on product
rather than on process innovations (Bertrand and Mol, 2013; Nieto and Rodríguez, 2011). This
is due to the type of knowledge required in each case, which for product innovations tends to
be more explicit, while for process innovations organizational closeness among the enterprises
is also required, which is more dicult.2
We consider two dierent networking strategies. Cooperation is a dummy equal to 1 if the
enterprise cooperates in innovation activities in a given year with at least one partner and zero
otherwise; whereas Outsourcing equals to 1 if the enterprise declares to have external R&D
expenditures in a given year and zero otherwise.3
To control for other rm characteristics relevant to explain innovative performance, we use
the log of internal R&D expenditures per employee (Internal R&D)4 to capture the rm's
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To measure the size of the rm (Size),
2We restrict the range of the variable to be in between 0 and 30, which accounts for 99 percent of the
observations and discard just 0.1 percent of enterprises in the sample. In our opinion, this is a necessary process
for three reasons: i) outliers can bias the estimations when dealing with non-linear multilevel models; ii) this
seems to be a more appropriate range for the variable; and iii) we nd convergence problems in the estimation
when dealing with the entire range of the variable.
3We are proxying the networking strategies used by the rm without any distinction between the knowledge
coming from within the region or beyond its boundaries, information not available in our dataset. Moreover,
the information from our dataset refers to technological cooperation instead of R&D cooperation, so that an
enterprise can collaborate with other organization while having zero internal R&D expenditure (see Table 2).
We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.
4This variable has been deated using the Consumer Price Index.
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we employ the total number of employees and its squared term to account for a non-linear
relationship. Another relevant variable is whether the rm belongs to a multinational corporate
group, since this may imply more resources, such as better nancial resources and a better
innovative environment (Belderbos et al., 2013). We proxy it with a dummy variable (Foreign)
being one in the case that the rm has more than 50 percent of its capital from abroad (Srholec,
2010). Finally, we include a dummy variable which equals 1 in the case the rm received public
funding from a government  regional, central, or others  for developing R&D above the total
average and zero otherwise (R&D government).
3.3 Regional level variables
We are interested in measuring the knowledge endowment of a region. As highlighted in pre-
vious studies, it can be approximated by regional R&D expenditures (Tödtling and Trippl,
2005) which are considered to be an important driver of economic growth accounting for the
innovativeness of the region (European Commission, 2014). The concentration of R&D activi-
ties in a region provides knowledge, new scientic discoveries, and develops new opportunities
for the rms located in the region (Feldman and Florida, 1994). Therefore, on the input side,
we account for the regional eort on R&D (GERD referring to R&D expenditures) as a re-
gional driver of rms' innovative performance (Sternberg and Arndt, 2001). This variable can
be disaggregated into the regional R&D expenditure of private enterprises (GERD business),
government (GERD government), and higher education sector (GERD HES).
In order to account for the accumulative process characterizing innovation, we employ a
measure of the stock of such knowledge instead of the ows of expenditure. This has several
advantages. First, it takes into account the fact that knowledge is path-dependence as well as
cumulative. And second, the stock is less aected by punctual shocks (exogenous or endogenous
to the region like certain policies) than the ows. Thus, we use the perpetual inventory method
(Peri, 2005) with a geometric mean of the growth rates of R&D spending and a depreciation
rate of ve percent, all measured in purchased power parity at constant prices of 2005.
On the output side of the innovation process, we propose to use information on the number
of patents in each region (Regional patents) through the computation of its stock using the
perpetual inventory method. This measure has been considered a proxy of the regional dier-
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ences regarding the regional innovation performance in previous studies (European Commission,
2014).5
Finally, in order to control for the wealth as well as the educational level of the region, we
employ GDP per capita and the percentage of people aged 25-64 years with tertiary education
(Tertiary education), respectively. In addition, we introduce technological sectoral dummies and
time dummies. All variables in the model are lagged one period in order to lessen simultaneity
problems.
4 Methodology
The importance of accounting for regional dierences through hierarchical models relies on
several theoretical reasons. First, the use of standard estimations  OLS  does not take into
account the dependence of those rm observations within the same region ending in a smaller
standard error, which would lead to articially higher signicance of the parameters (Hox, 2002).
They are usually assumed to be independent under this method of estimation, whereas rms
within the same region are more likely to be more similar among them than those in dierent
regions (van Oort et al., 2012). Second, the use of the multilevel approach allows us to model
variances instead of means as in the case of standard OLS regressions. This allows dividing the
total eect into rm-level eects and regional eects through random intercepts accounting for
the unobserved heterogeneity (van Oort et al., 2012). Third, the ecological fallacy stresses that
the study of individual relationships  rms in our case  cannot be analyzed using aggregated
data, so that the mixed of rm and regional level variables is an interesting type of analysis.
Since our number of regions is not too high  17 groups  we are aware of a possible bias
in our estimates, specically, in the case of the regional variance component (Maas and Hox,
2005). Previous research on the topic making use of multilevel modeling with such amount
of regions can be found in López-Bazo and Motellón (2018), also with 17 groups, and Srholec
(2015) with 15 groups. Following Stegmueller (2013), the random intercept model is the best
case scenario when the amount of the highest level group is in between 15 and 20. In such a
5Although there exist other indicators for measuring the regional knowledge base from the output side such
as the number of product and process innovations, statistical information on them are not available at the
regional level for Spain. We thank a referee for pointing this.
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case, the bias of the macro eects as well as the condence interval are virtually inexistent,
justifying the use of the random intercept model instead of the random slope one. Moreover, in
order to determine how regional characteristics aect the innovation performance of rms, we
plan to use cross interactions between some of our rm and regional variables. In this sense,
we follow Snijders and Bosker (2012) who stressed the latter as an appropriated strategy when
having theoretical/empirical reasons for them.
One of the assumptions of the multilevel model is the absence of correlation among the
explanatory variables and the random eects, otherwise leading to inconsistent estimations
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). We correct this possible endogeneity relying on Mundlak
(1978) and divide the time varying explanatory variables at the rm level into between and
within eects using the mean of those variables (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). This way, we
guarantee the absence of endogeneity due to the correlation among the rm level variables and
the rm's random eects.
In our case, the Hausman test adds no information in order to choose between the xed
and the random eects estimation since we are accessing to the same within eect as in the
xed eect estimation.6 On the one hand, due to the poor within variabilities of our set of
variables (see Tables A2 and A3 in the online Appendix) we think it is more appropriate to use
random eects on top of xed eects, since the latter only exploit within variabilities. On the
other hand, with the xed eect estimation it is not possible to model the eect of the regional
context on the rm level performance, which can be done in the multilevel model. That is,
with the xed eect estimation it is not possible to do inferences about time invariant variables
as well as for higher-level variances (Bell and Jones, 2015).
Another important issue is that given that the dependent variable is a count variable with
non-negative values, a normal distribution is not satisfactory due to the skewness of the variable
and, consequently, a Poisson model is preferred. However, as the Poisson distribution is very
restrictive in the sense that it assumes that the mean equals the variance, we decided to use
the Negative Binomial model that allows for overdispersion, being more robust (Snijders and
6Running a Wald test to the means of the rm level variables is asymptotically equivalent to a Hausman test
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). Moreover, other researchers stressed the misconception of many studies
when choosing between the xed and the random eects estimation based on the Hausman test (Bell and Jones,
2015).
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Bosker, 2012, chapter 17). Moreover, Bell et al. (2016) stressed that when estimating the
Negative Binomial, the multilevel random eects augmented with the between-within eects
is the best choice to produce within eects with the lower bias due to omitted higher-level
variables.7
4.1 Model specication
The structure of our specication is hierarchical since rms are nested in regions. However, as
we are dealing with a panel dataset, time is in fact our rst level of analysis (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012). Therefore, the hierarchy is the following: individual observations (time-rms)
are nested on rms, and rms are nested on regions.8 In order to account for this scheme, our
reduced form specication is as follows, where subscript i refers to the rm, j refers to the
region and t refers to time:


















γ11mnXijtmZjn + µ0j + µ0ij (1)
where Yijt refers to our dependent variable and Xijtm refers to the M time varying rm-
level characteristics, so that s is the number of time varying rm-level characteristics that are
our key rm-level variables (technological cooperation and R&D outsourcing), the rest being
control rm-level variables. Xijk are the K time invariant rm-level characteristics (sectoral
dummies plus between/Mundlak eects in our case), and Zjn will proxy for N regional-level
variables (being h the number of these regional-level characteristics that are our key region-level
7This is extremely important in our case since the low amount of highest-level units in the sample forces us
to use only a small set of highest-level controls.
8As we aim to studying regional dierences in the innovative performance of rms, it is important to highlight
that in the multilevel framework, the variables of the higher levels do not have to vary at the lower levels. That
is, all rms pertaining to a region will share the same value for a given regional variable. This is done by means
of time averaging regional variables, which is also useful for removing uctuations.
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variables, that is, the ones proxying for the endowment of knowledge available in the region).








are the random parts of the
model accounting for the error term of the region and the rm, respectively, which are assumed
to be independent of each other, of the covariates, across regions, and µ0ij is assumed to be
independent across rms as well. Therefore, we are estimating a multilevel negative binomial
random eect model with two random intercepts, one for the rm and another for the region.
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the regional variables in our rst and last year of analysis.
It is worth noting the huge diversity found among regions, since in the year 2000 the region with
the highest value of R&D per capita (Madrid) is eight times higher than that of the region with
the lowest amount (Baleares). More impressive is the dierence in the case of patents, since
Catalunya has 40 times more patents per million inhabitants than Cantabria. This dierence
is much higher than the variability found in the case of GDP per capita and the share of
tertiary education, which is only double. These gures show important regional dierences in
the innovative levels across Spanish regions, pointing to the necessity of controlling for them
when studying rms' innovative performance. Another remarkable fact is that for some regions
public R&D expenditures (government and universities) may compensate for the scarcity of
private expenditure. This could be the case of the Balearic and Canary Islands where public
expenditures per capita are 7 and almost 4 times higher than private ones, respectively, or
Extremadura with 2.7 times higher in 2000 and 4.2 in 2012. In addition, these dierences in
the proxies for knowledge endowments in the Spanish regions have not been decreasing in time,
but the contrary.
[Insert Table 1 around here]
Interesting observations can be extracted when comparing those rms that develop one of
the two networking strategies (technological cooperation and R&D outsourcing) and those that
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do not. As shown in Table 2, the average internal expenditure on R&D per worker is around ten
times higher for those that cooperate and they develop more product innovations. A similar
conclusion can be made when looking at those enterprises engaging in R&D outsourcing if
compared with those not engaged (see Table 3). In summary, rms engaged in technological
cooperation and/or outsourcing use more innovation resources and have a better innovative
performance than those enterprises that do not cooperate or outsource R&D.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 around here]
Table 4 contains seven dierent estimations in order to analyze how rm and regional
characteristics aect rms' innovative performance. We present the incidence rate ratios so
that the coecients can be interpreted as ratios of expected counts, the inuence being either
positive (if the ratio is higher than one) or negative (if lower than one) (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2012). In our rst specication (column 1), we only include rm characteristics 
level-1 as well as level-2, that is, time varying and time invariant rm characteristics  to
explain the variability of our dependent variable. As observed by the results of the Likelihood
Ratio tests, it is worth pointing out several conclusions. First, the variance of the rm as
well as the variance of the region is highly signicant, pointing to the necessity of using the
multilevel methodology. This way, our method of estimation takes into account the existence of
a certain correlation among the observations for a given rm as well as the correlation among
all rms pertaining to a given region. Second, although the regional variance is signicant, it
is lower than the rm level one. This is in accordance with recent literature, concluding that
regional characteristics are relevant for the innovativeness of rms but not as much as rm
characteristics themselves. Another interesting result is the existence of overdispersion in our
dependent variable, which can be evaluated with the ln(alpha) parameter, so that the Negative
Binomial is the most reasonable method of estimation in our case.
[Insert Table 4 around here]
This rst specication illustrates that all the variables at the rm level present the expected
sign. Internal R&D expenditures have a positive and signicant impact on the number of
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product innovations, validating the idea that more internal capabilities allow to develop new
ideas that can be transformed into new products (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Regarding the
size of the rm, we found evidence of a negative non-linear relationship, pointing to a more
advanced position of larger enterprises until a certain threshold. The impacts of receiving public
funding and of belonging to an international group do not seem to be dierent from zero. Our
two key variables, Cooperation and Outsourcing, present a positive and highly signicant eect
on the number of product innovations, supporting our rst hypothesis.
Lastly, the Wald test for the technological, time, and rms' mean values concludes that all
of them are jointly signicant. Therefore, it is guaranteed that our rm level coecients are
not driven by being correlated with the rm random eects. Another important result when
looking at all our dierent specications in Table 4 is that the sign as well as the magnitude of
the control variables' parameters at the rm level barely change. Finally, the regional variance
is reduced in columns 2 to 7, in comparison with the baseline specication in column one,
reecting that our model accounts for a great part of the regional variability.
To start analyzing the rest of the hypotheses of the article, specications 2 to 7 take into
account dierent measures to proxy for the knowledge base of a region. In particular, specica-
tions in columns 2 and 3 consider the regional stock of patents.9 Again, we note the relevance of
the networking strategies. Also, the variable measuring the regional stock of patents is highly
signicant, pointing to the fact that being located in a knowledge-dense region is important,
even for those rms not cooperating or not engaged in outsourcing. This is in accordance with
our second hypothesis and with the wide agreement that rms benet from being located in
knowledge-intensive regions (Audretsch and Dohse, 2007).
When we look at the cross eect between the regional innovation context and the rm's
networking activities on rms' performance, an interesting result appears. Firms obtain a higher
return of technological cooperation if they are located in regions with higher knowledge capacity
(measured through patents) given the signicant and higher than one value of the interaction
term. On the contrary, the signicant and lower than one parameter between outsourcing and
regional patents indicates that rms obtain a higher return from R&D outsourcing if they are
located in regions with low knowledge endowment. As argued in the literature review section,
9Due to a high correlation between GDP per capita and Tertiary education, we decided not to include both
controls at the time (see Table A4 in the online Appendix).
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the explanation for this result may come from the type of knowledge embedded in each strategy.
In the case of cooperating in technological activities, the knowledge is more technical and tacit,
so that the gains from the regional context and, more specically, from regional knowledge
spillovers, can be important since they will allow the rm to further elaborate the external
knowledge acquired through cooperation. While for outsourcing, the knowledge embedded
tends to be less complex and more standard and it is not necessary to construct a very dierent
knowledge from the one purchased, so that the knowledge spilling from other rms within the
region is not so essential; and being located in low innovative performance regions would imply
not being aected by erce competition. These results give empirical support to our third and
fourth hypotheses.
We now use the stock of R&D expenditures to proxy for the knowledge base of the region,
controlling again by GDP per capita (column 4) and Tertiary education (column 5) as well as
rm-level variables as in previous specications. Again, we obtain that the regional stock of
R&D exerts a positive and signicant direct inuence on the rm's innovative performance.
However, when crossing the regional stock with our key variables (technological cooperation
and R&D outsourcing), none of the parameters are signicant.
In order to study the reason behind this non-signicance of the cross-eect, as well as
to provide empirical evidence for our hypotheses 5 and 6, we separate the regional stock of
R&D into its dierent components, which could reect a dierent type of research, more basic
in the case of universities, research centers, and government, and more applied in the case of
businesses. The results are shown in columns 6 and 7. When crossing the dierent types of stock
of R&D with technological cooperation, we observe that the returns to technological cooperation
are higher if the rm is located in regions with higher research expenditures developed by private
agents. In contrast, the benets that rms obtain from cooperation are lower if they are located
in regions with a rich knowledge stock in the government and university sectors. These results
support hypotheses 5. Moreover, it seems that the non-signicance of such cross product in
column 5 could be due to the dierent directions when splitting R&D expenditures into the
public/business sectors canceling the signicance of the eect. All in all, rms obtain higher
returns from technological cooperation if they are located in regions with higher amount of
private R&D expenditures or if they are located in regions with lower amount of public ones,
given the nature of the knowledge embedded in both cases, more market-oriented in the rst
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case and science-based in the second.
On the contrary, we observe that rms located in regions with higher research expenditures
by private agents obtain lower returns from their R&D outsourcing strategy; whereas those
located in regions with higher amount of research developed by public institutions obtain higher
returns from outsourcing. These gures go in line with hypotheses 6 in the case of R&D
outsourcing. The result seems to indicate that rms in regions where the public research base
is higher might benet from a lower degree of competition (because the private research base
would be lower), while not being penalized by the little knowledge spillovers with a market-
oriented prole (which they do not need since the knowledge acquired through outsourcing is
easily absorbed due to its standard nature).
5.2 Robustness section
Several robustness analyses are considered.10 In the analysis so far, we are using an unbalanced
panel possibly leading to attrition problems. To correct for this, we use information present
in the survey recording the reasons for an enterprise leaving the survey, so that once corrected
by this, we may follow the assumption that missing values are random (Snijders and Bosker,
2012).11 Estimations show that the results do not change for our key variables (see Table A5
of the Appendix online).
We acknowledge that some enterprises may move from one region to another during the
period of analysis, possibly biasing our results due to the misrecognition of the characteristics
of the region where the enterprise was previously located, as well as its contribution to the
number of product innovations. According to Chung and Beretvas (2012), the bias due to the
lack of control for this in a multilevel framework would be higher, the higher the percentage
of rms changing locations, as well as the higher the number of regions they move to. We
do not expect a high bias in our estimations since the number of rms changing locations in
our sample is very low (3.8%) in comparison to theirs (10%). In any case, we re-estimated
10Because of space restrictions, all the results in this section are given in the online appendix. We thank the
three anonymous referees for highlighting some of the robustness checks in this section.
11We include a categorical variable with the following categories: the rm has split; it has acquired other
rms; it is born after a split process; it is a result of a merger process; it has changed the trademarks and legal
form; without change.
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our model discarding these moving rms and the results show that, qualitatively speaking, our
main conclusions are virtually the same (see Table A6 of the Appendix online).
Also, as suggested by Narula (2004), large enterprises (LEs) and small-medium sized en-
terprises (SME) dier in the intensity of use of the two networking strategies studied in this
paper. In the case of a small sample of European rms, Narula obtains that SMEs focus more
on outsourcing rather than alliances because of the higher risks and costs of managing dierent
partners while LEs prefer collaborative projects due to their larger portfolio of projects to oer
to their partners. Although our interest lies on the impact of networking and not the intensity
in their use, we wonder whether our results would maintain if the sample was divided between
SMEs and LEs. Even though most of our main results are maintained, it is worth stressing
that the regional context does not aect LEs as much as in the case of SMEs (see Tables A7
and A8 in the Appendix online).
When using a multilevel model, some enterprises might have an impact on regional per-
formance. Yet, this is probably not the case here since the territorial units we consider are
large and represent administrative authorities where a single rm is not suciently important
to aect regional performance. However, in order to test it, we skip very large enterprises 
those with more than one thousand workers  and most of our results behave the same (see
Table A9 in the Appendix online). The shortcoming of analyzing large regions  as in the case
of NUTS2 level in Spain  is that it is assumed that all rms take a similar advantage of the
regional capability; we acknowledge that a rm in Girona possibly should not take the same
prot from its environment as another rm located in Barcelona (both being part of Catalonia).
Unfortunately, we do not have further regional disaggregation to check for this.
In addition, we check the robustness of our results to the use of other proxies for some of
our explanatory variables. First, in relation to the regional variables and specically the use of
the patents as a proxy for the knowledge base of the region, we acknowledge that patents are
not always an equivalent measure of the innovative output across dierent sectors since some
of them present a lower propensity to patent. Therefore, an alternative measure of the regional
innovation base could be the employment in high and medium-high technological manufacturing
industries, as stressed in Feldman and Florida (1994) and in European Commission (2014). Our
results hold and behave in the same way, that is, those rms cooperating take more advantage
of such cooperation if they are located in a region with a higher share of high and medium-high
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tech manufacturing employment. While for those rms doing outsourcing, the return is higher
if they are located in regions with lower share of employment in high and medium-high tech
manufactures (see Table A10 in the Appendix online).
Second, among the rm level explanatory variables, even though we measure the internal
knowledge capacity of rms with the amount of R&D expenditures per employee as in most
previous studies, we analyzed the sensitivity of our results to the use of other proxies such as
the total employment in R&D, the employment in R&D with tertiary education (both mea-
sured as the number of people), and hiring of engineers/graduates with governmental/corporate
experience in R&D (a dummy variable). In all the cases, the conclusions are maintained (see
Tables A11-A13 of the Appendix online).
Third, in order to account for the dierential eect of sectors in the generation of new
products innovations  instead of the technological classication  we include sector xed eects.
Moreover, to control for the cohort of rms as well as its possible dierent impact on our
networking strategies, we include the age of the rm. In both cases the main conclusions are
maintained (see Tables A14 and A15 of the Appendix online, respectively). We also consider
the sensitivity of our results to several depreciation rates in the computation of the measure of
the stock of knowledge. If we use a 10 percent depreciation rate as in Peri (2005), instead of 5
percent, the results follow the same pattern (see Table A16 of the Appendix online).12
Finally, we have taken Wooldridge (2010, chapter 3) advice, and despite the collinearity
between our two main regional variables  GERD and Patents  we included them jointly in the
model in order not to confound their relation with our dependent variable. Our results show that
in fact this seems not to be an important issue since the pattern of our main results behaves the
same qualitatively and barely changes quantitatively (see Table A17 of the Appendix online).
6 Conclusion
This paper aligns in the literature that assesses the role of the regional context to ms' innova-
tive performance. In addition to the direct eect of the regional characteristics where the rm
is located, we hypothesize that it also shapes the returns to rms' networking activities. Specif-
12We also use 15 percent as in Rahko (2016) and results behave the same (results upon request from the
authors).
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ically, we analyze how the knowledge endowment of the region can inuence the eciency of the
networking activities carried out by the rm, explicitly technological cooperation agreements
and R&D outsourcing. We estimate a multilevel framework that combines information at the
rm level as well as the regional level for the case of Spanish manufactures in the 2000-2012
period, allowing to take explicit account of the multilevel structure of the data as well as its
panel structure.13
Among the main results, rst we nd that although rms' characteristics are obtained to
be more relevant than regional ones, something already stressed in recent studies (Backman,
2014; López-Bazo and Motellón, 2018; Naz et al., 2015; van Oort et al., 2012), the regional
context explains an important part of the variability of rms' innovative performance measured
through the number of product innovations introduced by the rm. We then give a step
forward and try to analyze the mechanisms through which the regional environment exerts
inuence on rms' performance. Our analysis considers that regional innovation environments
condition the returns of rms' networking activities. As a consequence, the eciency of the
technological cooperation and the R&D outsourcing carried out by the rm diers depending
on the characteristics of the region in which it is located. Explicitly, we nd evidence of
a reinforcement eect between being in a highly knowledge endowed region and the returns
obtained from cooperating technologically with other organizations. In contrast, enterprises
that acquire external knowledge through an outsourcing strategy have a higher return when
they are located in a region with a lower knowledge endowment.
In addition, we analyze if the results are maintained when we consider separately the regional
research eort made by the private sector as compared to the public one. It seems that the
benets obtained from technological cooperative agreements are higher in regions with a high
endowment of knowledge made by the private sector. On the other hand, the R&D outsourcing
strategy is more benecial in regions where the knowledge pool available is mainly due to public
institutions. All in all, we can conclude that a rm's ability to exploit external knowledge
acquired through networking activities depends crucially on the endowments of the region in
which it operates.
Some policy implications are envisaged. First, our results illustrate that although rms'
13To our knowledge, this has been done only in two papers on topics related to innovation (Acosta et al.,
2012; Naz et al., 2015).
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characteristics are of clear importance for innovative outcomes, rms are also inuenced by the
regional environment in which they are located, which is at the core of the `smart specialisation'
strategy of the European Commission (McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2015). Second, the results
in this paper align with the thinking that governments should not enforce winning or one-size-
ts-all types of policy. The mechanism to incorporate new knowledge into the rm needs to
t with the requirements, the kind of problem-solving involved, managerial capabilities, and
learning potential (Lucena, 2011; Teirlinck and Spithoven, 2013) of the enterprise but also take
into account the regional context. That is, policies used in an undierentiated manner for all
kinds of regions may be misleading. Finally, in Spain, the government has paid much attention
to the public-private innovation relationship, being one of the most important objectives in
terms of public policy (Vega-Jurado et al., 2009). However, in light of our results, in order
to improve the innovative performance of rms, policy makers should encourage and promote
knowledge transmission among relevant actors through networking activities, while taking into
account the contextual environment in which the rm is located.
Limitations & Future Research
Some limitations of our study are as follows. First, a possible endogeneity problem due to the
higher-level variables may arise. However, this problem is solved thanks to the use of the time
averaged regional variables as well as by the fact that we estimate a multilevel random eects
model augmented with the between-within eects. According to the literature, this is the best
choice to produce within eects with lower bias due to omitted higher-level variables (Bell et al.,
2016). Second, as in most previous studies, the present research assumes that spatial sorting
is exogenous to the rm. Therefore, the interpretation of the model must account for the fact
that rms' location choice does not inuence the impact of our measures of regional knowledge
endowment. However, even though panel data may help to control for this, we do not have
information on the location of the enterprises before the beginning of the survey. Moreover,
the study of the drivers of rms' location is beyond the scope of the article.
Finally, there is previous evidence on the importance of distance as a barrier to knowledge
sharing in case of collaborations while oering the possibility to access more dierent knowledge
(Acosta et al., 2011; Hoekman et al., 2010). Due to the lack of data on the geographical extent
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of the networking activities in the survey used in this paper, we do not address this study
empirically. However, it would be interesting to consider in future analyses how the regional
context can condition the returns to both regional and international collaboration, separately.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for enterprises cooperating and not cooperating (rm level)
Full Sample Non Cooperative Firms Cooperative Firms
VARIABLES mean sd N min max mean sd N min max mean sd N min max
Innovative Performance
NIP 0.863 2.935 26,506 0 30 0.382 1.981 18,241 0 30 1.924 4.163 8,265 0 30
Networking activities
Cooperation (dummy) 0.312 0.463 26,506 0 1
Outsourcing (dummy) 0.228 0.420 26,506 0 1 0.0576 0.233 18,241 0 1 0.605 0.489 8,265 0 1
Controls
Internal R&D 960.3 3,215 26,506 0 110,769 173.2 1,278 18,241 0 54,383 2,698 5,016 8,265 0 110,769
Size 223.0 692.1 26,506 1 15,003 108.5 350.4 18,241 1 10,100 475.9 1,083 8,265 5 15,003
R&D government (dummy) 0.067 0.250 26,506 0 1 0.005 0.069 18,241 0 1 0.204 0.403 8,265 0 1
Foreign (dummy) 0.162 0.368 26,506 0 1 0.103 0.305 18,241 0 1 0.290 0.454 8,265 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for enterprises doing outsourcing and not doing outsourcing (rm
level)
No R&D Outsourcing R&D Outsourcing
VARIABLES mean sd N min max mean sd N min max
Innovative Performance
NIP 0.547 2.404 20,457 0 30 1.931 4.089 6,049 0 30
Networking activities
Cooperation (dummy) 0.160 0.366 20,457 0 1 0.826 0.379 6,049 0 1
Controls
Internal R&D (dummy) 402.8 2,013 20,457 0 110,769 2,846 5,194 6,049 0 73,057
Size 132.3 393.7 20,457 1 12,939 530.0 1,205 6,049 3 15,003
R&D government (dummy) 0.014 0.118 20,457 0 1 0.245 0.430 6,049 0 1
Foreign (dummy) 0.127 0.332 20,457 0 1 0.281 0.449 6,049 0 1
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Table 4: Role of regional knowledge endowment on the benets obtained from the acquisition
of external knowledge
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.308*** 1.242*** 1.242*** 1.302*** 1.303*** 1.373*** 1.375***
(0.062) (0.081) (0.081) (0.098) (0.098) (0.116) (0.115)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.158** 1.284*** 1.284*** 1.244** 1.245** 1.191 1.192
(0.083) (0.110) (0.110) (0.128) (0.128) (0.169) (0.169)
InternalR&Dt−1 (in log) 1.051*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.050*** 1.050***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Sizet−1 (in log) 2.041*** 2.045*** 2.045*** 2.042*** 2.042*** 2.023*** 2.025***
(0.255) (0.254) (0.254) (0.252) (0.252) (0.254) (0.254)
Size2t−1 (in log) 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.962*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963*** 0.963***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
R&D governmentt−1(dummy) 1.067 1.067 1.067 1.068 1.068 1.068 1.068
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Foreignt−1(dummy) 1.289 1.292 1.292 1.289 1.289 1.289 1.289
(0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (0.214) (0.213) (0.214) (0.214)
Technological dummies Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.171*** 1.145***
(0.067) (0.057)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.029* 1.029*
(0.015) (0.015)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.947** 0.947**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021*** 1.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.958 0.971
(0.027) (0.020)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.973*** 0.973***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.989 0.986
(0.013) (0.019)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.976*** 0.976***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.025*** 1.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.221*** 1.197***
(0.088) (0.081)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.958** 0.957**
(0.020) (0.020)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.040 1.039
(0.033) (0.033)
GDP per capita 0.984 0.976 1.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.991 0.982 1.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002***




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.103 0.078 0.079 0.073 0.068 0.023 0.028
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.138 4.132 4.133 4.133 4.134 4.134 4.133
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4943*** 4925*** 4925*** 4880*** 4888*** 4759*** 4767***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.13*** 15.89*** 15.89*** 14.06*** 11.80*** 1.520 2.508*
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 949.3*** 859.3*** 865.9*** 794.6*** 794.6*** 817.6*** 817.9***
Wald Test T ime dummies 798.1*** 791.9*** 813.8*** 780.9*** 807.8*** 818.1*** 809.1***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space.
We corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
Appendix
Table A1. Technological classication of the manufacturing sectors
Sector Denomination NACE Rev.1 NACE Rev.2
Low-Tech
1 Meat products 151 101
2 Food and tobacco 152 to 158 + 160 102 to 109, 120
3 Beverage 159 110
4 Textiles and clothing 171 to 177 and 181 to 183 131 to 133, 139, 141 to 143
5 Leather, fur and footwear 191 to 193 151 + 152
6 Timber 201 to 205 161 + 162
7 Paper 211 + 212 171 + 172
8 Printing (before Printing and Edition) 221 to 223 181 + 182
19 Furniture 361 310
20 Other manufacturing 362 to 366, 371 to 372 321 to 325, 329
Medium Low-tech
10 Plastic and rubber products 251 to 252 221 + 222
11 Nonmetal mineral products 261 to 268 231 to 237, 239
12 Basic metal products 271 to 275 241 to 245
13 Fabricated metal products 281 to 287 251 to 257, 259
Medium High-tech
14 Machinery and equipment 291 to 297 281 to 284, 289
16 Electric materials and accessories 311 to 316 y 321 a 323 271 to 275, 279
17 Vehicles and accessories 341 to 343 291 to 293
18 Other transport equipment 351 to 355 301 to 304, 309
High-tech
9 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 241 to 247 201 to 206, 211 + 212
(before Chemical products)
15 Computer products, electronics and optical 300 + (331 to 335) 261 to 268
Source: ESEE and Eurostat. http://www.fundacionsepi.es/investigacion/esee/en/svariables/disponibles.asp
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics of the regional variables in the empirical analysis
VARIABLES mean sd min max Observations
Stock GERD Overall 6,967 10,019 306.8 47,263 N 221
Between 10,013 518.6 37,731 n 17
Within 2,364 -1,768 16,524 T 13
Stock GERD business Overall 3,662 5,923 37.28 25,866 N 221
Between 5,925 92.93 20,245 n 17
Within 1,374 -1,768 9,282 T 13
Stock GERD government Overall 1,186 2,447 18.64 12,757 N 221
Between 2,465 64.31 10,389 n 17
Within 493.4 -796.8 3,553 T 13
Stock GERD HES Overall 2,125 2,197 94.60 8,447 N 221
Between 2,183 133.6 6,803 n 17
Within 568.3 253.1 4,231 T 13
Stock Regional patents Overall 633.5 1,120 6.42 5,880 N 221
Between 1,108 40.07 4,469 n 17
Within 303.9 -888.7 2,045 T 13
GDP per capita Overall 24,272 4,861 14,182 35,607 N 221
Between 4,749 16,446 32,846 n 17
Within 1,518 20,478 27,429 T 13
Tertiary education Overall 27.87 6.57 15.50 46 N 221
Between 5.81 20.72 39.70 n 17
Within 3.37 20.17 35.28 T 13
Table A3. Descriptive statistics of the rm level variables in the empirical analysis
VARIABLES mean sd min max Observations
Cooperation (dummy) Overall 0.312 0.463 0 1 N 26,506
Between 0.402 0 1 n 4,010
Within 0.251 -0.622 1.245 T-bar 6.61
Outsourcing (dummy) Overall 0.228 0.420 0 1 N 26,506
Between 0.357 0 1 n 4,010
Within 0.236 -0.705 1.162 T-bar 6.61
log (Internal R&D) Overall 2.174 3.402 0 11.62 N 26,506
Between 3.075 0 10.71 n 4,010
Within 1.603 -6.660 10.72 T-bar 6.61
log (Size) Overall 4.211 1.439 0.693 9.616 N 26,506
Between 1.357 0.693 9.406 n 4,010
Within 0.257 -0.822 6.562 T-bar 6.61
R&D Government (dummy) Overall 0.067 0.250 0 1 N 26,506
Between 0.190 0 1 n 4,010
Within 0.165 -0.866 1 T-bar 6.61
Foreign (dummy) Overall 0.162 0.368 0 1 N 26,506
Between 0.338 0 1 n 4,010
Within 0.123 -0.772 1.095 T-bar 6.61
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Table A4. Correlation matrix of the variables in the empirical analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Cooperation (dummy) 1
(2) Outsourcing (dummy) 0.604 1
(3) log (Internal R&D) 0.709 0.575 1
(4) log (Size) 0.497 0.439 0.482 1
(5) R&D Government (dummy) 0.369 0.389 0.439 0.320 1
(6) Foreign (dummy) 0.235 0.171 0.218 0.443 0.087 1
(7) Stock of GERD 0.008 -0.003 0.057 0.005 -0.016 0.080 1
(8) Stock of Regional patents 0.085 0.058 0.134 0.070 0.000 0.115 0.715 1
(9) GDP per capita 0.071 0.064 0.126 0.076 0.061 0.132 0.750 0.582 1
(10) Tertiary education 0.061 0.063 0.101 0.079 0.084 0.100 0.563 0.223 0.871 1
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Table A5. Assuming missing at random
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.309*** 1.242*** 1.242*** 1.303*** 1.304*** 1.374***
(0.062) (0.080) (0.080) (0.098) (0.098) (0.115)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.161** 1.288*** 1.288*** 1.249** 1.250** 1.198
(0.083) (0.109) (0.109) (0.127) (0.127) (0.168)
Firm level controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.171*** 1.145***
(0.068) (0.057)
Cooperationt−1(dummy)* Regional stock of patentst−1 1.029** 1.029**
(0.015) (0.015)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.947** 0.947**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021*** 1.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.971
(0.020)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022***
(0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.973***
(0.006)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.986
(0.019)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.976***
(0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.025***
(0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.198***
(0.081)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.958**
(0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.038
(0.033)
GDP per capita 0.984 0.976
(0.016) (0.015)
Tertiari education 0.991 0.982 1.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.566***
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.103)
V ariance (Region) 0.104 0.078 0.079 0.073 0.069 0.029
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.138 4.133 4.133 4.133 4.134 4.133
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4945*** 4928*** 4928*** 4883*** 4891*** 4770***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.25*** 16*** 16*** 14.16*** 11.89*** 2.548*
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 886.9*** 805*** 812.5*** 744.3*** 746.5*** 767.1***
Wald Test T ime dummies 863.7*** 856.3*** 881.4*** 842.5*** 873.3*** 872***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included.
The null hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the
parameter space. We corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
We include a categorical variable (CAMBIO) with the following categories: it has splitted; it has acquired other rms; it has
born after a split process; it is a result of a merger process;it has changed the trademarks and legal form; without change;
being the rst category the reference one. Specication (6) is missing due to convergence problems with the model.
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Table A6. Excluding enterprises moving among regions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.323*** 1.248*** 1.248*** 1.270*** 1.271*** 1.338*** 1.341***
(0.064) (0.080) (0.080) (0.093) (0.092) (0.106) (0.105)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.155** 1.273*** 1.273*** 1.246** 1.247** 1.185 1.185
(0.082) (0.118) (0.118) (0.137) (0.138) (0.184) (0.185)
Firm level controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.168*** 1.152***
(0.066) (0.058)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.032*** 1.032***
(0.012) (0.012)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.951** 0.951**
(0.023) (0.023)
Stock GERDt−1 1.020*** 1.018***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.002 1.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.948* 0.970
(0.028) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.019*** 1.019***
(0.004) (0.004)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.975*** 0.975***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.983 0.979
(0.014) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.986*** 0.986***
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.020*** 1.019***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.249*** 1.211***
(0.097) (0.088)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.966** 0.965**
(0.015) (0.014)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.039 1.039
(0.035) (0.035)
GDP per capita 0.990 0.983 1.033
(0.019) (0.020) (0.028)
Tertiari education 0.994 0.986 1.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Constant 0.015*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.580*** 0.579*** 0.579*** 0.580*** 0.580*** 0.579*** 0.579***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
V ariance (Region) 0.120 0.090 0.091 0.086 0.082 0.020 0.030
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.161 4.157 4.157 4.157 4.158 4.159 4.157
Observations 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648 22,648
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4595*** 4577*** 4578*** 4540*** 4545*** 4412*** 4426***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 20.72*** 15.18 *** 15.18*** 14.02*** 11.42*** 0.908 2.125*
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 974.5*** 912.8*** 909.4*** 830.3*** 828.4*** 878.1*** 870.5***
Wald Test T ime dummies 1364*** 1427*** 1418*** 1439*** 1434*** 1397*** 1397***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A7. Main results for Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.214*** 1.072 1.071 1.069 1.069 1.005 1.002
(0.082) (0.106) (0.105) (0.128) (0.127) (0.172) (0.170)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.215* 1.359** 1.359** 1.239 1.239 1.203 1.209
(0.122) (0.170) (0.170) (0.176) (0.176) (0.230) (0.232)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.197** 1.175**
(0.093) (0.076)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.068** 1.068**
(0.028) (0.028)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.944 0.944
(0.033) (0.033)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021** 1.019**
(0.010) (0.008)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.007 1.007
(0.004) (0.004)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.999 0.999
(0.006) (0.006)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.920*** 0.953**
(0.023) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.007 1.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.970*** 0.971***
(0.010) (0.010)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.970** 0.956*
(0.013) (0.026)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.989* 0.989**
(0.006) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.044*** 1.044***
(0.008) (0.009)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.334*** 1.285***
(0.093) (0.099)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.033 1.032
(0.035) (0.035)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.043 1.040
(0.041) (0.042)
GDP per capita 0.990 0.985 1.063**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
Tertiari education 1.001 0.992 1.027
(0.020) (0.022) (0.021)
Constant 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.759*** 0.758*** 0.758*** 0.758*** 0.758*** 0.756*** 0.756***
(0.041) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
V ariance (Region) 0.194 0.148 0.155 0.146 0.148 5.22e-30 0.019
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.972 4.967 4.966 4.968 4.968 4.995 4.987
Observations 17,852 17,852 17,852 17,852 17,852 17,852 17,852
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 2857*** 2857*** 2857*** 2835*** 2844*** 2730.48*** 2730.06***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 18.21*** 14.07*** 14.07*** 13.91*** 12.71*** 0.55
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 917.8*** 1040*** 1092*** 983.8*** 1025*** 937.55*** 978.16***
Wald Test T ime dummies 20176*** 20678*** 20754*** 18383*** 18248*** 12779*** 12349***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A8. Main results for Large enterprises (LEs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.491*** 1.501*** 1.500*** 1.662*** 1.660*** 1.812*** 1.812***
(0.143) (0.197) (0.196) (0.235) (0.234) (0.291) (0.291)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.101 1.220* 1.222* 1.211 1.216 1.139 1.145
(0.089) (0.128) (0.128) (0.154) (0.154) (0.196) (0.196)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.115*** 1.085***
(0.035) (0.033)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.997 0.997
(0.033) (0.033)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.946** 0.945**
(0.024) (0.024)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021*** 1.018***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.992 0.992
(0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.994 0.994
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 1.002 0.998
(0.018) (0.015)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.036*** 1.036***
(0.012) (0.012)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.969*** 0.969***
(0.006) (0.006)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.018* 1.033***
(0.010) (0.011)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.941*** 0.941***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.087 1.069
(0.056) (0.048)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.911* 0.910*
(0.046) (0.046)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.052 1.050
(0.039) (0.039)
GDP per capita 0.977* 0.969** 0.974
(0.012) (0.014) (0.017)
Tertiari education 0.981*** 0.973*** 0.976***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Constant 3.561 2.404 2.391 2.320 2.486 1.716 1.807
(6.158) (4.022) (4.052) (3.744) (4.256) (3.096) (3.228)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.277***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
V ariance (Region) 1.62e-32 1.62e-32 3.62e-35 7.32e-33 1.80e-35 5.06e-34 4.44e-35
V ariance (Firm−Region) 2.842 2.842 2.839 2.842 2.833 2.834 2.830
Observations 6,322 6,322 6,322 6,322 6,322 6,322 6,322
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 1748*** 1719*** 1720*** 1679*** 1677*** 1661*** 1661***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 0.00374
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 314.2*** 344.33*** 365.37*** 280.35*** 357.75*** 351.85*** 400.65***
Wald Test T ime dummies 1451*** 1558*** 1577*** 1463*** 1476*** 1334*** 1355***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A9. Excluding very large rms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.295*** 1.216*** 1.216*** 1.263*** 1.264*** 1.267*** 1.267***
(0.050) (0.061) (0.061) (0.080) (0.079) (0.096) (0.094)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.190*** 1.310*** 1.310*** 1.290** 1.291** 1.237* 1.236
(0.078) (0.112) (0.112) (0.128) (0.128) (0.159) (0.159)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.166** 1.148**
(0.071) (0.062)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.036*** 1.036***
(0.012) (0.012)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.950** 0.950**
(0.021) (0.021)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021*** 1.020***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.001 1.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.995 0.995
(0.003) (0.003)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.946* 0.965
(0.029) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.014*** 1.015***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.976*** 0.976***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.990 0.983
(0.014) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.977*** 0.977***
(0.004) (0.004)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.018*** 1.018***
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.248*** 1.218***
(0.099) (0.092)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.989 0.988
(0.019) (0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.035 1.035
(0.029) (0.029)
GDP per capita 0.989 0.981 1.032
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027)
Tertiari education 0.995 0.985 1.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Constant 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.620*** 0.619*** 0.619***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
V ariance (Region) 0.128 0.101 0.103 0.093 0.091 0.026 0.035
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.213 4.208 4.208 4.208 4.209 4.211 4.209
Observations 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372 23,372
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4542*** 4531*** 4531*** 4486*** 4495*** 4352*** 4362***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 23.81*** 19.33*** 19.33*** 16.84*** 15.07*** 1.52 2.95**
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 948.6*** 880.77*** 882.79*** 820.77*** 818.55*** 833.64*** 826.3***
Wald Test T ime dummies 3567*** 3587*** 3518*** 3728*** 3667*** 3489*** 3414***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Firm level controls Yes Yes
High med− high tech employmentt−1 1.010 1.024
(0.045) (0.041)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * High med− high tech employmentt−1 1.028*** 1.028***
(0.011) (0.011)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * High med− high tech employmentt−1 0.963** 0.963**
(0.018) (0.018)






Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.568***
(0.029) (0.029)
V ariance (Region) 0.105 0.104
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.132 4.132
Observations 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4935*** 4942***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 20.55*** 20.03***
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 934.2*** 936***
Wald Test T ime dummies 802.9*** 824.1***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and
time xed eects included. The null hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a
χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We corrected for this
following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A11. Controlling by Total employment in R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.305*** 1.246*** 1.246*** 1.304*** 1.306*** 1.388*** 1.390***
(0.060) (0.081) (0.081) (0.096) (0.096) (0.122) (0.121)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.163** 1.288*** 1.288*** 1.250** 1.251** 1.198 1.198
(0.085) (0.110) (0.110) (0.128) (0.128) (0.166) (0.166)
Total employment in R&Dt−1 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.173*** 1.146***
(0.068) (0.058)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.026* 1.026*
(0.016) (0.016)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.948** 0.948**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.022*** 1.020***
(0.005) (0.004)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.961 0.973
(0.028) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.973*** 0.973***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.991 0.989
(0.014) (0.020)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.977*** 0.977***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.025*** 1.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.213** 1.190**
(0.092) (0.083)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.953** 0.953**
(0.020) (0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.039 1.039
(0.032) (0.033)
GDP per capita 0.982 0.975* 1.015
(0.017) (0.015) (0.024)
Tertiari education 0.990 0.980 1.002
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015)
Constant 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.571***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
V ariance (Region) 0.120 0.084 0 .084 0 .077 0 .072 0 .031 0 .035
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.144 4.140 4.140 4.140 4.141 4.139 4.139
Observations 23,900 23,900 23,900 23,900 23,900 23,900 23,900
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4895*** 4879*** 4879*** 4834*** 4842*** 4712*** 4720***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.68*** 16.62*** 16.62*** 14.21*** 11.84*** 2.324* 3.193**
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 762.2*** 704.9*** 710.4*** 651*** 653.2*** 670.2*** 670.6***
Wald Test T ime dummies 890.1*** 878.7*** 903.6*** 873.5*** 904.2*** 914*** 908.8***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A12. Controlling by Employment in R&D with tertiary education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.303*** 1.236*** 1.236*** 1.292*** 1.293*** 1.366*** 1.368***
(0.059) (0.079) (0.079) (0.096) (0.095) (0.117) (0.116)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.161** 1.285*** 1.285*** 1.242** 1.243** 1.181 1.181
(0.085) (0.110) (0.110) (0.129) (0.129) (0.164) (0.164)
Employment in R&D with tertiary educationt−1 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.173*** 1.148***
(0.068) (0.058)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.030** 1.030**
(0.015) (0.015)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.948** 0.948**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.022*** 1.020***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.959 0.972
(0.027) (0.020)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.972*** 0.972***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.990 0.987
(0.013) (0.019)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.977*** 0.977***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.026*** 1.026***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.219*** 1.195***
(0.088) (0.081)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.957** 0.957**
(0.020) (0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.045 1.045
(0.033) (0.033)
GDP per capita 0.984 0.976 1.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.992 0.982 1.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0 .569*** 0 .569*** 0 .569*** 0 .569*** 0 .569*** 0 .568*** 0 .568***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
V ariance (Region) 0.106 0.079 0.080 0.072 0.068 0.023 0.028
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.108 4.103 4.103 4.104 4.105 4.105 4.104
Observations 24,110 24,110 24,110 24,110 24,110 24,110 24,110
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4908*** 4891*** 4891*** 4847*** 4855*** 4725*** 4733***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.73*** 16.38*** 16.38*** 13.98*** 11.78*** 1.523 2.511*
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 1067*** 954.8*** 967.6*** 867.7*** 870.9*** 890.4*** 895.3***
Wald Test T ime dummies 764.4*** 759.1*** 777.5*** 750.7*** 772.5*** 783.8*** 776.1***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A13. Controlling by engineers/graduates with governmental/corporate experience in
R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.299*** 1.229*** 1.229*** 1.293*** 1.294*** 1.356*** 1.358***
(0.062) (0.080) (0.079) (0.099) (0.099) (0.115) (0.114)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.159** 1.287*** 1.287*** 1.246** 1.247** 1.190 1.190
(0.083) (0.111) (0.111) (0.129) (0.129) (0.170) (0.171)
Hiring Personnel in R&D 1.060 1.061 1.061 1.060 1.060 1.060 1.060
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.171*** 1.146***
(0.067) (0.057)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.031** 1.031**
(0.015) (0.015)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.946** 0.946**
(0.021) (0.021)
Stock GERDt−1 1.021*** 1.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.957 0.972
(0.027) (0.020)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.972*** 0.972***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.986 0.983
(0.013) (0.019)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.974*** 0.974***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.025*** 1.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.225*** 1.199***
(0.088) (0.081)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.960* 0.960*
(0.021) (0.020)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.042 1.041
(0.034) (0.034)
GDP per capita 0.984 0.978 1.022
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.991 0.982 1.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Constant 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.103 0.077 0.078 0.074 0.070 0.023 0.029
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.106 4.101 4.101 4.101 4.103 4.102 4.100
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4921*** 4903*** 4903*** 4858*** 4865*** 4730*** 4740***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.81*** 16.19*** 16.19*** 15.06*** 12.48*** 1.623 2.738**
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 1697*** 1693*** 1717*** 1585*** 1575*** 1691*** 1668***
Wald Test T ime dummies 743.7*** 742*** 761*** 727.6*** 751*** 763*** 754.5***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A14. Including sectoral xed eects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.309*** 1.245*** 1.245*** 1.307*** 1.308*** 1.381*** 1.381***
(0.063) (0.081) (0.080) (0.098) (0.098) (0.115) (0.113)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.158** 1.282*** 1.282*** 1.242** 1.243** 1.183 1.183
(0.082) (0.114) (0.114) (0.132) (0.132) (0.173) (0.173)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.181*** 1.154***
(0.070) (0.056)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.028* 1.028**
(0.015) (0.014)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.948** 0.948**
(0.022) (0.022)
Stock GERDt−1 1.022*** 1.019***
(0.006) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.964 0.974
(0.028) (0.022)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.973*** 0.973***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.982 0.977
(0.015) (0.022)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.975*** 0.975***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.024*** 1.024***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.215*** 1.201**
(0.088) (0.086)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.957** 0.957**
(0.020) (0.020)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.043 1.043
(0.034) (0.035)
GDP per capita 0.985 0.979 1.019
(0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
Tertiari education 0.995 0.986 1.009
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Constant 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.110 0.081 0.083 0.078 0.076 0.030 0 .035
V ariance (Firm−Region) 3.950 3.945 3.945 3.945 3.946 3.944 3.943
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4639*** 4631*** 4630*** 4598*** 4606*** 4493*** 4494***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.52*** 15.75*** 15.75*** 14.67*** 12.64*** 2.398* 3.428**
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 952*** 854*** 864.3*** 804.2*** 809.9*** 847.2*** 849.8***
Wald Test T ime dummies 805.5*** 794*** 814*** 782.8*** 805*** 816.3*** 806.6***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A15. Controlling for Firm´s Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.305*** 1.248*** 1.248*** 1.317*** 1.318*** 1.394*** 1.396***
(0.061) (0.083) (0.082) (0.099) (0.099) (0.119) (0.118)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.158** 1.278*** 1.279*** 1.247** 1.248** 1.205 1.206
(0.082) (0.108) (0.108) (0.127) (0.127) (0.169) (0.170)
Firm´s Age 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.177*** 1.149***
(0.069) (0.059)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.025 1.025
(0.016) (0.016)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.949** 0.949**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.022*** 1.020***
(0.006) (0.004)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.999 0.999
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.961 0.973
(0.028) (0.021)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.976*** 0.976***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.989 0.987
(0.013) (0.019)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.974*** 0.974***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.021*** 1.021***
(0.006) (0.006)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.218*** 1.197***
(0.091) (0.083)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.954** 0.954**
(0.020) (0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.032 1.031
(0.032) (0.032)
GDP per capita 0.982 0.975* 1.016
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.991 0.981 1.003
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Constant 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.108 0.080 0.081 0.076 0.071 0.029 0.033
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.136 4.131 4.132 4.130 4.131 4.129 4.128
Observations 23,907 23,907 23,907 23,907 23,907 23,907 23,907
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4897*** 4875*** 4875*** 4830*** 4838*** 4712*** 4717***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.58*** 15.89*** 15.89*** 14.40*** 11.79*** 2.104* 2.995**
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 1030*** 858.3*** 871.5*** 834.2*** 838.7*** 874.8*** 881.2***
Wald Test T ime dummies 1118*** 1137*** 1167*** 1114*** 1143*** 1144*** 1148***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A16. Using a depreciation rate of 10% for the computation of stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.308*** 1.241*** 1.241*** 1.298*** 1.300*** 1.368*** 1.369***
(0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.100) (0.099) (0.114) (0.112)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.158** 1.287*** 1.287*** 1.253** 1.254** 1.214 1.215
(0.083) (0.113) (0.113) (0.132) (0.132) (0.175) (0.175)
Firm level controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.262*** 1.220***
(0.108) (0.090)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.042* 1.042*
(0.023) (0.023)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.924** 0.924**
(0.029) (0.029)
Stock GERDt−1 1.034*** 1.030***
(0.009) (0.007)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.001 1.001
(0.004) (0.004)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.993 0.993
(0.006) (0.006)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.936 0.956
(0.039) (0.030)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.034*** 1.034***
(0.009) (0.009)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.962*** 0.962***
(0.009) (0.009)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.996 0.989
(0.024) (0.033)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.956*** 0.956***
(0.009) (0.009)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.044*** 1.044***
(0.009) (0.009)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.347*** 1.310***
(0.140) (0.131)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.940** 0.939**
(0.028) (0.027)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.045 1.045
(0.047) (0.048)
GDP per capita 0.983 0.975 1.020
(0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.991 0.982 1.006
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
Constant 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.103 0.077 0.078 0.070 0.067 0.023 0.028
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.138 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.133 4.134 4.132
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4943*** 4924*** 4924*** 4877*** 4886*** 4769*** 4774***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.13*** 15.72*** 15.72*** 13.35*** 11.60*** 1.393 2.380*
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 949.3*** 857.4*** 864*** 792.8*** 791.4*** 807*** 805.9***
Wald Test T ime dummies 798.1*** 790.9*** 813.7*** 780.9*** 809*** 819.4*** 810.9***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space.
We corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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Table A17. Including jointly both measures of regional knowledge endowment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP NIP
Cooperationt−1(dummy) 1.308*** 1.242*** 1.242*** 1.303*** 1.303*** 1.375*** 1.374***
(0.062) (0.081) (0.081) (0.098) (0.098) (0.115) (0.114)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) 1.158** 1.284*** 1.284*** 1.245** 1.246** 1.194 1.194
(0.083) (0.110) (0.110) (0.128) (0.128) (0.169) (0.169)
Firm level controls Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Regional stock of patentst−1 1.084** 1.050 1.081** 1.046 1.141 1.209
(0.044) (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.178) (0.191)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 1.029* 1.029*
(0.015) (0.015)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) * Regional stock of patentst−1 0.947** 0.947**
(0.020) (0.020)
Stock GERDt−1 1.014*** 1.014*** 1.015*** 1.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 1.000 1.000
(0.003) (0.003)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERDt−1 0.996 0.996
(0.004) (0.004)
Stock GERD businesst−1 0.924 0.921*
(0.045) (0.043)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 1.022*** 1.022***
(0.006) (0.006)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD businesst−1 0.973*** 0.973***
(0.007) (0.007)
Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.041 1.056
(0.070) (0.068)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 0.976*** 0.976***
(0.005) (0.005)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD governmentt−1 1.025*** 1.025***
(0.005) (0.005)
Stock GERD HESt−1 1.198** 1.175**
(0.095) (0.082)
Cooperationt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 0.957** 0.957**
(0.020) (0.019)
Outsourcingt−1(dummy) *Stock GERD HESt−1 1.039 1.039
(0.034) (0.034)
GDP per capita 0.974* 0.974* 1.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023)
Tertiari education 0.983 0.983 1.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Random Part of the Model
ln(alpha) 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.568*** 0.567*** 0.567*** 0.567***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102)
V ariance (Region) 0.103 0.067 0 .068 0.068 0.068 0.018 0.022
V ariance (Firm−Region) 4.138 4.133 4.134 4.133 4.134 4.136 4.134
Observations 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174 24,174
Number of groups 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Likelihood ratio test F irm random intercept 4943*** 4895*** 4900*** 4881*** 4887*** 4759*** 4758***
Likelihood ratio test Region random intercept 21.13*** 12.59*** 12.59*** 12.60*** 11.90*** 0.852 1.561
Wald Test Mean values (Mundlak) 949.3*** 809.9*** 810.3*** 795.6*** 795.7*** 803.9*** 817***
Wald Test T ime dummies 798.1*** 791.6*** 819.1*** 780.6*** 808*** 832*** 817.9***
Robust SE in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Incidence rate ratios. Means and time xed eects included. The null
hypothesis for the likelihood ratio tests does not follow a χ2 distribution because it is not on the boundary of the parameter space. We
corrected for this following Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 88-89).
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